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Megan Horning
BORDER TOWN BULLIES: THE
BAD AUTO DEAL AND SUBPRIME
LENDING PROBLEM AMONG
NAVAJO NATION CAR BUYERS
Introduction
Lucille Platero, an elderly Navajo woman, traveled to a border town to
purchase a car. She was looking for a small car that fit her budget. Instead,
the salespeople had her test drive a large truck. The salespeople forced Ms.
Platero to leave her license and social security card at the dealership during
the test drive. Their high-pressure sales tactics lasted all day. In the evening,
when she was tired, she agreed to purchase the truck. On her way home, the
truck broke down. The dealer refused to fix the truck and repossessed the
car after some time. Despite Ms. Platero’s dispossession, she still received
calls for the repossessed vehicle.1
Because of the Navajo Nation’s geographic remoteness, rough roads, lack
of water and electricity, and vehicle-dependent livelihood, Navajo Nation2
residents need vehicles for daily survival, ideally large four-wheel-drive
vehicles. Navajo Nation border towns are the closest and most convenient
locations for many Navajo individuals to purchase such vehicles. As a result,
these border towns have an unusually high number of car dealerships who
are eager to meet this demand. 3 Navajo car buyers’ geographic and cultural
circumstances create a “strong demand to buy cars and incentive to sell
cars,” but also “create a market place ripe for excessive greed” to an even
greater extent than is typically present in U.S. auto sales.4 Border town auto
dealerships frequently exploit Navajo car buyers, especially tribal elders,5
through deceptive and aggressive sales tactics. The auto dealerships’ zeal for
profit also translates into high interest “excessive lending” through subprime
lending companies.6 Because a car is often the “single largest investment” a
__________________________
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Navajo family makes,7 the unfair auto deals and subprime lending rampant in
Navajo Nation border towns are devastating for Navajo individuals, families,
communities, and the entire Navajo Nation.
This article argues that due to the circumstances of Navajo Nation residents, Navajo car buyers have a greater need for cars and are therefore disproportionately harmed by unfair border town auto deals and subprime auto
loans. Additionally, this article suggests several ways to address these issues
while acknowledging the conundrum created if Navajo Nation residents are
prevented from buying cars.
Part I of this article describes the current U.S. auto sales and lending
process, including the stages of car buying, credit score calculation, and
how national auto sales, lending, and investment markets profit from
unfair car sales and subprime lending. Part II details the geographic
remoteness, unique cultural differences, and living circumstances of the
Navajo Nation and the relationship between those circumstances and the
desperate need for a vehicle and the resulting vulnerability many Navajo
people experience. Part III uses data from the Navajo Nation Human
Rights Commission8 and sample Navajo purchaser auto contracts to illustrate the extreme tactics Navajo Nation border town auto dealerships
and subprime lending companies used to bully Navajo car buyers into
bad auto deals and unsustainable subprime loans. Part IV provides solutions to alleviate and eliminate bad auto deals and subprime loans for
Navajo car buyers.

I. How salesmen, dealers, lenders, and investors
profit from U.S. auto sales
The American auto sales industry works to promote dealers’, lenders’, and
investors’ profits. Section A outlines the stages of the auto sales and lending
processes as experienced by car buyers. Section B describes the American
credit scoring system and how it limits low-credit car buyers’ choices. Section
C reveals auto salespeoples’, dealers’, and lenders’ incentives to pressure low
credit score car buyers into loans they are not likely to be able to repay and
details their methods for doing so.

A. The stages of a car purchase and loan
An overview of the basic stages of the car purchase-sale process is a
helpful starting point for understanding auto lending in the U.S., which
is discussed in the next section 9 First, a person interested in buying a car
selects a car model and car dealer or vice versa. Next, the prospective buyer
negotiates with car salespeople, employees of the dealership, to determine a
car’s principal price, and the inclusion or exclusion and price of additional
features. Unlike other major purchases, taxes, title fees, cost of repairs and
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warranties, and the costs of paying off a loan on an existing car are added
to the car’s list price.10
This negotiation process, and the added fees, can be confusing and
stressful to buyers. One particularly stressful aspect of the negotiation and
purchase process is the loan agreement. The auto dealer, lender, and buyer
must all agree upon the interest rate and terms of the loan. Usually, after
sending out loan applications to several lending companies, the dealer and
buyer will select a loan based on the interest rate and terms offered by the
lender.11 This process is often known as “getting financing approved.” In
determining whether a buyer should be approved for a loan, there should
be an independent and objective review of a buyer’s credit, which includes
examining the buyer’s debt-income ratio.12 Immediately after the contract is
signed, the dealer sells the contract to the lending company, which then takes
possession of the car title. Consequently, the lender—not the dealership—accepts the buyer’s payments until the loan is fully repaid.13

B. Subprime auto loans among car buyers with low credit scores
For the vast majority of Americans, cars are a primary means of sustenance and survival, a symbol of pride, freedom, and the ability to “control
[] one’s own destiny.”14 Research has found that car ownership is closely tied
to the economic success of American families.15 Cars are frequently one of
the largest assets American families own, and can often be the most valuable
asset of families who do not own their own homes.16 As very few Americans
are able to pay in cash upfront when purchasing a car, financing and paying
installments on a loan is common. 17
The auto lending industry categorizes borrowers based on their credit
score.18 Credit scores below 620 are considered to be subprime and have much
higher interest rates than credit scores above 620, which are considered less
risky by lenders.19 Factors that can lower a borrower’s credit score include
multiple delinquent payments on other loans, charge-offs,20 repossessions,
bankruptcies, low household incomes,21 dilatory credit card repayments, and
dilatory or partial home mortgage repayments. 22 Occasionally, periods of
“acute financial stress” such as a failed marriage, failed business, or highcost serious illness can also lower an individual’s credit score.23 Many with
low credit scores have low incomes or are young and have not made many
purchases on credit.24 These low scores yield higher interest rates during
financing. Dividing borrowers into two distinct categories—low-credit risk
prime lending and medium to high credit risk subprime lending—results in
a disparate impact on lower credit scoring auto loan borrowers.25
Most auto loans are given to borrowers with “prime” credit scores,26 borrowers whose credit report factors include “having a credit history of at least
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three years, non-delinquent historic performance on installment debt, and at
least two years of employment.”27 Borrowers with prime credit scores can
often obtain low interest auto loans directly from their own finance company,
bank, or credit union.28 In these loans, the borrower signs a contract with his
or her finance company, bank, or credit union to pay the “amount financed”
which is the total price determined with the dealership plus a finance charge,
which is an interest rate set by the finance company, bank, or credit union.
29
The finance company, bank, or credit union will then loan the borrower
cash to purchase the vehicle in exchange for a security interest in the car.30
Since the subprime mortgage crisis, banks have tightened lending standards
and it is even more difficult for borrowers with medium to low credit scores
to obtain low interest loans.31
Subprime borrowers can often only obtain auto loans from subprime
lending agencies because of the tightened restrictions traditional lending
agencies place on subprime borrowers.32 Most subprime auto loans are executed through three forms of dealership financing:33 (1) the dealer solicits
outside lending companies to evaluate the borrower’s credit and offer the
borrower a loan;34 (2) the dealer’s own financing arm purchases the loan;35 or
(3) a traditional banking or financing institution carries the loan.36 All three
forms of subprime auto lenders charge much higher interest rates than the
rates charged for prime auto loans.
For example, interest rates above six percent are considered very high for
an auto loan.37 Interest rates in subprime auto loans, however, can rise to the
double digits, resulting in a loan with eventual costs that are equal to or more
than the car’s actual value.38 Nevertheless, many car buyers have no choice
but to enter into subprime auto loans despite higher interest rates, because
their need for a car outweighs the costs of obtaining one.39
If a buyer enters into a subprime loan with an unreasonable repayment
plan, particularly in light of the buyer’s income, it is likely that the car will be
repossessed when the buyer inevitably defaults. Upon repossession, the holder
of the contract can sell the car at auction to recover some of the costs of the
car. However, because the car has likely depreciated in value, the holder is
unlikely to recover the contract price. Consequently, the lender may choose
to obtain a deficiency judgment against the buyer, where the buyer becomes
responsible for the difference between what the lender received at auction
and the price of the vehicle under the purchase contract.40

C. High profits drive auto salespeople, dealers, lenders, and
investors to lend to and invest in low credit car buyers
While high interest rates associated with subprime lending clearly disadvantage borrowers, there are strong incentives for auto dealers and auto
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lenders to offer subprime loans. Although it may seem counter-intuitive for
dealers and lenders to provide financing to borrowers less likely to repay their
loans, dealers and lenders actually benefit from making subprime loans and
carrying large quantities of subprime loan debt. These benefits outweigh the
corresponding risks of default, which has in turn led to a dramatic growth in
subprime auto-lending industries and investment in such industries.
1. Dealer incentives for subprime loans and unscrupulous tactics
Auto-dealers are motivated by numerous incentives and kickbacks that
accompany auto sales and auto lending.41 On the most basic level, because
auto salespeople are paid on commission they are motivated to sell as many
cars and make the largest loans as possible.42 With the general aim of making
profits, auto salespeople and dealerships engage in insidious practices to push
auto loans on people with low credit scores. While the loans themselves are
legal, the sales tactics used appear less so.
In some cases, the aggressive sales tactics used on vulnerable subprime
buyers include fraud and deception. First, auto dealers receive dealer reserve
kickbacks, which are “a slice of the interest on the loan” given to dealers
by lending agencies every time they make a new loan.43 Accordingly, auto
salespeople push borrowers towards higher interest rate loans because the
kickback percentages are higher for higher interest rate loans. This is true even
when a borrower’s credit score could qualify for lower interest rates.44 Second,
these kickbacks incentivize simple overselling. Salespeople are encouraged
to persuade purchasers to choose bigger, more expensive cars. A bigger car
requires a bigger loan, which results in a greater kickback to salespeople.45
Auto salespeople can also increase the overall size of a loan by “loan packing,” which adds “overpriced and unused or frankly unnecessary” products
to the loan, such as guaranteed auto protection (“GAP”) insurance,46 rustproofing,47 extended service contracts, or warranties that are already covered
by the manufacturer. GAP insurance is optional insurance coverage added to
a collision insurance policy and may pay the difference between a car’s loan
balance and what the insurance company will pay if the car is considered
a covered total loss. 48 Similarly, by adding hidden fees called “add-ons” to
purchase contracts, auto salespeople can increase the size of a loan without
borrowers noticing until they leave the lot and the loan is final. 49
Bait and switch tactics are also used to increase the size of a loan, which
involves substituting more expensive cars, with added features, after a buyer
has already committed to a basic model.50 Finally, as noted above, auto loans
are frequently made to cover both the purchase price of a new car and the
negative equity on a borrower’s trade-in.51
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In addition to the kickbacks, auto salespeople and dealers employ practices
that can increase profits even after a loan is finalized. For instance, when borrowers fail to pay their auto loans, dealers often repossess their cars and sell
them for a higher value in a practice called “churning.”52 In some instances
of churning, “hundreds of cars have been sold multiple times by used car
dealers.”53 This practice has also evolved into the often-illegal practices of
spot delivery and yo-yo car sales, both described in detail below.
For some dealers and auto salespeople, the profit-motive is so strong that
they resort to “illegal business practices, such as forging signatures on sales
contracts, falsifying information on credit applications, and wrongfully repossessing vehicles.”54 Ultimately, once the contract and title of the car have
been sold to the lending agency and the auto dealer receives the purchase
price of the car, and receives its cut of the interest, the auto dealer is no longer
accountable for the car’s costs. Accordingly, the risk of default has passed
to the lending agency.
2. Lender incentives to make subprime auto loans
Despite the assumption that lending companies are only successful if
borrowers repay their loans, auto lenders also have significant motivations to
make subprime auto loans. A common assumption in the lending business is
that “the risk of not being paid back on the loan [should] act[] as a constraint
on lending behavior and encourage[] lenders to monitor credit worthiness of
the borrower out of self-interest.”55 If the lender collects enough in interest
and fees over time, however, the lender may still make a profit even with
a loss of some of the principle.56 Thus, there are several ways auto lenders
profit from the fees and interest charges on subprime auto loans. In general,
lending companies profit from the interest rates they charge borrowers, and
occasionally, this interest can generate a profit greater than the value of the
car itself.57
One way lending companies profit from subprime auto loans is when the
dealer and lender agree to permit the dealer to mark up the borrower’s interest rate from the rate originally set by the lending company. This increase is
added to the dealer’s profits. This strengthens the relationship between the
lender and dealer, ensuring the lending company’s continued business with
the dealer.58 Lenders can also profit from subprime auto loans by allowing
dealers to screen borrowers for them. This saves the lender from paying
screening fees. 59
Moreover, because auto loans cannot be discharged by bankruptcy,60
lenders are promised repayment or repossession.61 This assurance provides
an “enormous incentive” for auto lenders to lend to borrowers with low credit
who are unlikely to repay and has led to “excessive” subprime auto lending.62
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The risk of not profiting when a borrower fails to pay his or her auto loan is
mitigated through churning, as discussed above.63 In fact, repossession has
become increasingly easy for lenders as automatic systems that locate and
shut a car off remotely have replaced the traditional method of sending repo
men to find, boot, and tow away cars upon default.64 Subprime auto lending is a profitable practice for auto lenders because the risk of losing profit
on defaulted subprime loans is mitigated by high interest rates that survive
bankruptcy and the ease of selling a repossessed car.
Additionally, loan securitization, bundling, and reselling create a culture
that disregards borrower default. Lenders’ lack of concern as to whether
loans will be repaid stems from the lender cashing out on the loan early and
selling any associated risks early on in the loan’s life.65 In turn, securitizing,
bundling, and reselling encourage lenders to find higher numbers of low
credit borrowers to increase profits.66
3. Investor incentives to invest in subprime auto loans
As noted above, subprime loans are often “bundled” together, and after
a series of repurchasing and repackaging, these bundles are sold to an investor in a hedge fund or high yield mutual fund.67 Specifically, after a lending
company takes the title of a subprime auto loan, it typically bundles it with
thousands of similar auto loans into a “collateralized bond instrument.”68
These collateralized bond instruments can then be “sold off in pieces to the
highest bidders”69 as if they are “investment grade securities.”70 These bidders
are investors seeking returns on the high double-digit interest rate charges
levied on subprime auto loans. Inflated interest rates yield great returns for
investments, particularly “in a market where interest rates on whole hover
stubbornly close to zero.”71 Additionally, collateralized subprime loans are
appealing to investors because they have high returns compared to other
auto loan investments and carry substantially lower risks than subprime
mortgages.72 For example, Wall Street stockbrokers have been successful in
selling subprime auto loan bundles to even “the most stalwart institutional
investors, including insurance companies and public pension funds.”73 These
collateralized subprime loans are perceived as a reliable investment because
the “sheer necessity of car ownership . . . precludes the possibility of a huge
decline in overall sale.”74 Through securitization, auto dealers and lenders
offering subprime loans pass the risk of default onto investors, which in turn
places the risk of loss upon public pensions.75
Investors are essentially gambling when they invest in bundled subprime loans. Investors wager that a sufficient number of borrowers within
the bundled security will be able to pay enough of their loans to generate a
profit, notwithstanding that many will default along the way. And, because
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subprime loans have extremely high interest rates, lenders enjoy good odds
that they will profit before the borrower goes under and defaults. However,
in spite of good odds, such investments always carry an inherent risk that a
larger number of buyers will default, resulting in overall losses to the investor.76 While it would seem poor judgment to invest in loans that are unlikely
to be repaid, the strong motivation for profit encourages auto dealers and
lenders to offer subprime auto loans. Likewise, profit is the driving force in
investors’ “buying fren[zy]” in subprime loan instruments.77
4. The subprime auto industry is sparsely regulated
Taking into account Americans’ persistent need for cars and the rapid
growth of the subprime auto-lending industry, the subprime auto industry is
surprisingly unregulated. While the economic downturn after the mortgage
crisis spurred new regulations that cracked down on subprime lending for
home mortgages and credit cards,78 auto sales lobbyists successfully spared
the auto-lending industry from similar regulations, including the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform Act79 and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.80
Consequently, high interest rate loans, like subprime auto loans, are generally legal under state and federal law and there are few legal regulations for
policing the subprime auto loan industry.81 This lack of enforcement power,
paired with the multi-level motivation for profit, perpetuates a “vicious cycle
of aggressive [subprime auto] lending.”82
5. Many subprime loans are predatory
There exists a “marketplace ripe for excessive greed[,]” because of the
continued and widespread demand for cars and the strong incentive for profits
at all levels of the auto sales industry.83 Advocates for auto buyers and borrowers struggle to balance the need for regulation with low credit buyers’
need for financing.84 As subprime lenders serve people with no alternative
access to credit, “subprime loans target some of the nation’s most desperate
and least financially savvy consumers, many of whom have experienced
extended periods of dire financial straits” or come from communities that
have been systematically denied credit.85 While not all subprime car loans
are the result of predatory tactics,86 many are predatory in nature because
auto dealers regularly and unfairly engage in deceptive and fraudulent practices. Thus, most subprime loans in the last decade have been the product of
predatory lending practices.87
6. Harmful effects of subprime auto loans on borrowers,
families, and communities
The growth of the subprime lending industry and related lack of industry
regulation has resulted in harmful effects for borrowers, their families, and
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the communities in which they live. Subprime auto loans can put individual
borrowers into cycles of debt that impact the family and individual’s emotional
and financial health for generations. These cycles of intergenerational debt, in
the aggregate, can hinder an entire community’s economy, and even threaten
the stability of the national economy as happened in 2008.
Subprime auto loans’ harmful effects wreak long-lasting and detrimental
financial havoc on borrowers. Typically, subprime borrowers borrow much
more than what their car is actually worth and take much longer to pay off
loans compared to borrowers with prime auto loans.88 For example, in order
to keep a low credit borrower’s monthly payments low, subprime lenders
stretch the borrower’s installment payments out for a longer term.89 While the
average prime auto loan lasts four to five years, it takes close to six years to
pay off the average subprime auto loan.90 Longer loan periods give subprime
borrowers’ cars’ trade-in value more time to depreciate, ultimately causing
many subprime borrowers to transfer the remaining balance left on a wornout car to a new car purchase.91 Alternatively, someone who purchases a car
with a subprime auto loan may pay for the car for months or years after the
car is no longer running and worthless. The harmful effects of subprime
loans bring individuals—whose finances are already unstable—into a cycle
of “incur[ring] excessive debt.”92
The cycle of debt incurred from subprime auto loans also impacts the
families and communities of borrowers. A borrower’s debt and associated low
credit score affect the upward economic mobility of borrowers’ children.93
This occurs in two ways. First, financial stress experienced by parents can
inhibit children’s learning in school, well-being at home, and later pose a
barrier to higher education.94 Second, like other forms of intergenerational
poverty, parents pass on to their children their low credit scores and correlated
high interest rates and debt. For example, parents with a low credit score may
not be able to cosign on a child’s auto loan, borrow through a bank or credit
union, or assist in paying off a vehicle quickly.95
On a larger scale, excessive indebtedness also harms communities. For
example, borrowers with high interest rates are less able to make purchases
or investments that contribute to their local economy, and may even avoid
entrepreneurship.96 Such collateral consequences contribute to a cycle of
poverty where the poorest are forced to incur the highest rates of debt in
order to purchase a car.97 This adds to the growing national wealth gap98
and maintains an economic underclass in our society.99 On a national scale,
economists warn that the same factors that led to the mortgage crisis and
dramatic economic downturn in 2008100 are also present in the subprime auto
lending industry and pose serious risks for our nation’s economic future.101
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II. Navajo Nation residents are especially vulnerable to bad
auto deals and subprime auto loans
The Navajo Nation and the surrounding border towns are one area of Indian Country where unfair car sales and lending practices disproportionately
impact low income Native American car buyers. These circumstances result
in the Navajo Nation’s residents’ unique vulnerability to predatory lending
schemes in the car industry.
The following section describes some of the realities of Navajo life today
with respect to Navajo Nation residents’ heightened need to buy cars and their
vulnerability in auto deals. Section A shows how Navajo Nation residents’
rough roads, spread out homes, and sources of income require car ownership for survival. Issues involving poverty, literacy, and language are the
three most influential factors that make some Navajo car buyers especially
vulnerable to unfair auto sales and lending. Section A also describes the
limited options Navajo Nation residents have to purchase goods, services,
and cars in border towns where exploitive sales practices are prevalent. Section B outlines the Navajo Nation’s legal response to these unfair auto sales
and lending practices. It focuses on how this civil regulatory jurisdiction is
limited by the Navajo Nation’s borders.

A. Realities of Navajo Nation life
The Navajo Nation, home of the largest Native American tribe in the
United States, spans Arizona, Utah, and New Mexico and covers over 27,000
square miles.102 In 2014, the Navajo Nation population totaled over 300,000
members,103 more than half of whom resided on the Navajo Nation reservation.104 The Navajo Nation is admired by outsiders for its maintenance of
Navajo language and culture, traditional lifestyles105 and high desert landscapes, from red sandstone spires and canyons to mountains and plateaus.
The Navajo Nation extends about 160 miles north to south and just over
300 miles from east to west.106 There are about 15,000 miles of public roads
on the Navajo Nation.107 However, this estimate does not include the hundreds
of miles of personal roads individuals have built from main public roads to
reach their rural homes. Within the Navajo Nation, only 23 percent of public
roads are paved, while the remaining majority are dirt roads.108 Public transportation is rare in most parts of the Navajo Nation109
Due to the geographical breadth of the Navajo Nation and the limited
infrastructure, Navajo Nation residents live differently from other Americans.
Vehicle ownership is very important to this lifestyle. Most Navajo Nation
residents live spread apart in small single-family homes with extended family.110
Many of these homes do not have running water, electricity, and telephone and
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internet services.111 To address these needs, many Navajo families use their
vehicles to haul water in large plastic tanks from nearby towns and wells and
haul coal or wood to heat their homes.112
Vehicle ownership is also essential to Navajo Nation families’ income.
Working away from family home sites or away from the Navajo Nation is a
primary source of income for many Navajo Nation residents. Most of these
jobs require long daily commutes to worksites in border towns, schools,
hospitals, power plants, or mines. Additionally, numerous Navajo workers
generate income by traveling across the United States to do welding, construction, or mining work at temporary job sites. These workers not only use
their vehicles to travel to job sites but also live out of their vehicles while on
the job. Other Navajo workers derive income through Jeep and truck tours
of tourist destinations such as Monument Valley, Canyon de Chelly, and
Antelope Canyon. Many Navajo Nation families make or supplement their
income and continue traditional ways of life by raising livestock, such as
cattle, sheep, goats, and horses.113 Consequently, having large trucks to haul
water, feed, and trailer livestock is critical to this source of income.
In combination with the high need for vehicle ownership explained above,
high poverty and illiteracy on the Navajo Nation make many Navajo Nation
car buyers vulnerable to unfair auto sales and lending practices.114 In 2010,
38 percent of Navajo Nation residents were classified as severely poor and
living below the poverty line.115 That same year, the median household income
of Navajo Nation residents was $27,389.116 About half of the Navajo population speaks the Navajo language at home, while many elders speak only the
Navajo language.117 Many middle-aged and elderly Navajos were either subjected to deliberate and abusive assimilation practices in boarding schools,
or did not attend school at all. This resulted in many not learning to speak,
read, or write English well.118 This problem has carried over to twenty-first
century Navajo students because of a lack of school funding and inadequate
culturally responsive education.119 They are often not as academically successful as their non-Navajo peers.120 These poverty, literacy, and language
factors contribute to Navajo car buyers’ vulnerability during exploitive sales
and lending practices.
Border towns, which are situated just across the Navajo Nation borders,
serve as hubs of goods and services for Navajo Nation residents and as homes
for many Navajo tribal members who work off the reservation. The largest of
these border towns are Page, Arizona; Holbrook, Arizona; Winslow, Arizona;
Flagstaff, Arizona; Gallup, New Mexico; Grants, New Mexico; Farmington,
New Mexico; Albuquerque, New Mexico; and Cortez, Colorado.121 These
border towns often contain the nearest grocery stores, clothing and supply
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stores, banks, hospitals, schools, laundromats, and restaurants for many
Navajo Nation residents.122 For some Navajo Nation residents, the drive to
the nearest border town is often over 100 miles.123 Depending on the season,
reaching these border towns require Navajo residents to traverse deep sand,
mud, snow, and ice.124
The Navajo Nation Humans Rights Commission describes Navajo Nation residents’ travel to these border towns as a “daily exodus.” Each day,
approximately 12,470 vehicles travel into Gallup and 7,015 vehicles travel
into Farmington.125 These counts show just how crucial vehicle ownership
is for Navajo families who travel to border towns for goods and services.
Furthermore, the Navajo Nation Human Rights Commission, recognized
the emotional importance of vehicle ownership to Navajo families, when it
stated that “[a]cquiring a new vehicle brings pride to a household and instills
a sense of accomplishment and wealth.”126
As a result of border towns being isolated hubs of commerce, there is a
long-standing pattern of commercially exploiting the Navajo residents’ heavy
reliance on the border towns’ goods and services. Border town main streets
are often lined with trading posts, pawn shops, payday lenders, auto title
lenders, tax anticipation lenders, rent-to-own furniture stores, liquor stores,
and bars. And many border towns are infamous for poverty, violence, alcoholism, and alcohol-related deaths.127 Yet, as discussed below, one common
and often unmentioned venue of border town exploitation is car dealerships.
All of the above factors illustrate the unique and heightened “need for transportation” among Navajo Nation residents,128 and the ways in which Navajo
customers are vulnerable to car dealers’ greedy auto sales tactics and high
interest rate loans.

B. The Navajo Nation’s legal response to residents’
need for vehicles
In light of the residents’ vulnerability to exploitive commercial practices,
the Navajo Nation Council enacted a highly protective consumer protection
law in 1999.129 The Navajo Nation Consumer Practices Act (“Act”) protects
consumers from unfair, deceptive, and unconscionable sales practices by
sellers of goods and services within the Navajo Nation.130 The Act directly
addresses car sales, including provisions on motor vehicle warranties, and
provides the right to ask for a Navajo language translator and caps on interest rates. 131 Further, the Act precludes repossessing cars from the Navajo
Nation without the owner’s voluntary written consent or an order from a
Navajo Nation court.132 While the Act aspires to protect Navajo car buyers,
the place of sale determines its application. As a result, many of its provisions are inapplicable to Navajo car buyers who purchase vehicles in border
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towns just outside of the Navajo Nation.133 Instead, state law and state courts
govern such sales.

III. Unfair border town auto deals and subprime lending to
Navajo car buyers
The discriminatory practices of Navajo border town auto dealers and
lenders are particularly acute when compared to the national auto sales and
lending climate. Furthermore, the magnitude of high interest subprime auto
loans sold to Navajo car buyers harms the purchasers, their families, and
communities. Part IV below details the drastic discriminatory circumstances
Navajo car buyers experience when purchasing and paying off vehicles based
upon data from a recent Navajo Nation Human Rights Commission Report
(“Report”)134 and analysis of sample the auto contracts and finance applications from recent Navajo car buyers.

A. Navajo car buyers are isolated from information and competition
This section draws upon the experiences of Navajo car buyers to illustrate
the ways that border town bullies (lenders and dealers) target this population
with unfair auto deals and unsustainable auto loans throughout the car buying process. This section presents these abuses in the order of the car buying
process: (1) car dealer and car model selection, (2) auto contract negotiation,
(3) auto financing, and (4) repossession.
The remote geography, unique Navajo way of life, and prevalent poverty on the Navajo Nation each create barriers to information and a lack of
options for Navajo car buyers—a problem uncommon elsewhere the U.S.
Larger cities with numerous car dealerships, such as Phoenix, Arizona;
Salt Lake City, Utah; and Albuquerque, New Mexico, are difficult for most
Navajo car buyers to access because they are hundreds of miles from most
Navajo Nation residents’ homes. Thus, most Navajo car buyers are limited
to purchasing cars from the dealerships available in the large Navajo Nation border towns: Gallup and Farmington, New Mexico and Holbrook and
Flagstaff, Arizona.135 Because these border towns are still hours away from
many Navajo car buyer’s homes, the distance between home and dealership
exacerbates the pressure of making a purchase and diminishes a car buyers
opportunity to make informed choices.
Additionally, many Navajo car buyers “lack[] basic information about
purchasing a vehicle[,]” which limits their ability to compare dealers and
car prices. Missing information includes “[i]information on credit profiles,
warranties, and blue book values.”136 This problem is, in part, because many
Navajo homes are without internet access.137 Additionally, language and
literacy barriers prevent many Navajo individuals, especially elders, from
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understanding available consumer information.138 Survey results from the
Report show that only about 40 percent of Navajo car buyers research the
car they intended to buy before entering a dealership.139

B. Border town bullies use unscrupulous tactics during contract
negotiation ensure high profits
Navajo Nation border town auto salespeople and dealers use various legal
and illegal tactics to sell high quantities of vehicles and to increase profits
in car sales with Navajo consumers.140 Navajo car buyers’ experiences illustrate how Navajo border town dealers and salespeople take these tactics
to the extreme by capitalizing on Navajo car buyers’ unique characteristics
and vulnerabilities.
For example, many dealers use advertisements to target Navajo car buyers,
a common tactic because local advertisements are a leading factor when a
Navajo car buyer chooses a dealership.141 Advertisements target Navajo car
buyers by using Navajo language, livestock and hay giveaways, and “free”
barbeques.142 Dealership employees use many aggressive marketing tactics,
including official-looking mailings that read “You’ve Won a Car!,” providing
fake car keys, and false checks claiming to be cashable at local dealerships.143
In some instances, the Navajo Nation government shows support for these
dealers by allowing the dealers to sponsor Navajo Nation fairs and contribute
prizes to Navajo Nation Gaming Association incentives.144
1. Raising the price and additional features
Navajo border town dealers use high-pressure tactics to sell expensive
vehicles with high interest rates to earn big commissions and dealer kickbacks.
These profit-boosting tactics are frequently deceptive and forceful. Add-ons
are a common profit-boosting tactic among border town dealers. Navajo car
buyers’ contracts are often “laced with add-ons” that the car buyer does not
notice, and that “make no sense, cost too much, and keep the family in debt.”145
For instance, one Navajo elder found that he had a maintenance service
agreement in his contract that required him to travel a hundred miles to Gallup
every time he needed his vehicle serviced.146 GAP insurance is a similarly
expensive add-on, commonly added onto Navajo car buyers’ contracts. Yet,
border town bullies rarely honor GAP insurance when Navajo car buyers
seek to collect on their GAP insurance policies.147 One Navajo elder even
described how she had to take out a loan to cover repairs when the GAP
insurance was not honored.148
Moreover, border town auto dealers do not limit themselves to the typical auto sales add-ons. They frequently create add-ons specific to the car.
These provisions are slipped stealthily into contracts. One Navajo mother
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who intended to pay $20,000 for a car for her college student son was told
that her son could sign the contract by himself in the morning. Later, when
she reviewed the signed contract, the mother saw that an additional $10,000
in add-ons, including a $4,000 service charge and a $499 tire fee, had been
added to the contract overnight, without their knowledge.149
2. Pressure to buy expensive alternate vehicles
Border town auto dealers also persuade Navajo car buyers to purchase
entirely different cars that what the buyer originally intended.150 In one instance, a dealership sold a Navajo buyer a two-wheel drive truck, worth less
than his trade-in, under the impression it was a higher valued four-wheel
drive truck.151 Similarly, when salespeople realize that low income or a poor
credit score may prevent a buyer from getting a loan for a larger make or
model, the salespeople force a sale by pressuring the buyer into a smaller,
less expensive model that may not fit the buyer’s needs. One Navajo elder was
pressured into buying a small truck when he really needed a larger vehicle,
and later he had to pawn his valuables to make the $600 monthly payments
on the small truck.152 Forcing buyers into purchasing cars the buyer did not
want, is another predatory tactic used in these border towns.
3. Two cars at once
Among the most egregious trade-in schemes border town dealers use is
selling Navajo car buyers two cars at once. Generally, with this scheme, the
dealership first sells a buyer a car that quickly turns out to be faulty. When
the buyer takes the car back to the dealership, the dealer feigns agreement
to take control of the car and then sells the buyer another model. Instead of
trading in the old car, as the buyer would expect, the dealer simply sells the
buyer another contract, meanwhile, the dealer the keeps possession of the
old car while the buyer still maintains ownership according to the title. And
then, in a month’s time, the buyer receives billing statements for both cars,
even though the buyer does not possess either the first car or the title. In this
way, the dealer profits from the first car by repossessing it and reselling it
to another buyer.153
4. Closing the deal and issues at signing
Dealers ensure profit by using a variety of nefarious, deceptive, and highpressure tactics to ensure Navajo car buyers sign auto contracts. “[S]ome automobile dealers literally preyed on Navajo families, purposely misled them and
pressured them into signing contracts when the consumer’s financial means
[were] not there at the beginning of negotiating the contract.”154 Further, the
circumstances surrounding these auto contracts “deprived [many Navajos]
of the right to freely negotiate a contract under the conditions acceptable
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and understood by the consumer.”155 Many Navajo car buyers complained
of lengthy auto contracts “filled with legal jargon” that they could not easily
understand.156 A majority of Navajo car buyers admitted to relying on verbal
agreements with dealers and salespeople. For that reason, they did not read
their auto contracts closely. 157 Nor were they aware of the contract’s contents,
including whether down payments, trade-ins, and add-ons were included.158
One way border town auto dealers frequently pressure Navajo car buyers
into assuming high costs and unfair contracts is by refusing interpreters for
Navajo car buyers who do not speak English.159 This denial occurs in two
ways. Some dealers simply do not provide in-house interpreters. Others
barred relatives who accompany car buyers specifically to interpret during
contract negotiations. 160
As a part of their strategy to compel Navajo car buyers into signing auto
contracts, border town auto dealers aim to wear down Navajo car buyers.
Many participants reported being delayed for the entire day at dealerships
and then rushed into signing a contract before closing.161 This delaying tactic
deserves greater attention, since many Navajo car buyers have to make special
plans, save money, and travel over a hundred miles to reach a dealership,
followed by another hundred miles to drive home the same evening. While
prolonging the sale and wearing down the buyer, dealers and salespeople also
frequently and illegally detain potential buyers by holding their car keys,
driver’s licenses, and/or social security cards until a contract is signed.162
One Navajo elder who decided not to purchase a car that day had to call the
police before the dealer would return his keys and license.163
In some cases, border town auto dealers have even threatened purchasers.
In one striking instance, a dealer called a middle-aged man at 1:30 in the
morning. The purpose of the call was to force the man to sign an incomplete
auto contract. The dealer threatened the man that if he did not sign the contract, he would report the car as stolen to the police. All the while, the dealer
actually had physical possession of the vehicle.164
Another way border town auto dealers lure Navajo car buyers into contracts is by manipulating income and demographic information on buyer
finance applications. The dealer may do this to improve the chances that the
buyer will obtain financing or to increase the interest rate on the loan. Many
Navajo car buyers have been pressured into “soft” credit checks at a grocery
store, fair, or flea market, in which salespeople collect their demographic
information and later use it to solicit auto loans, often without the potential
buyer’s knowledge.165 Some individuals even reported they were made to
believe they were entering their demographic information for a contest or
raffle and not for a car loan.166
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Salespeople use names and addresses gained in these credit checks to
locate people at home where they could pressure them into signing contracts.167 This is especially common among the elderly who feel vulnerable
and pressured at home when they are alone with a stranger.168 Based on
these credit checks, many potential Navajo buyers are told they are eligible
for a loan when an accurate analysis of their income would indicate otherwise.169 Navajo car buyers also complain of being confused about who
is financing the loan.170
Lastly, a common way dealers and salespeople ensure a contract is finalized is by instructing Navajo car buyers to lie about their income and/or
down payment amounts.171 In the worst instances, the salespeople forge these
amounts themselves.172
5. Yo-yo sales and spot deliveries
A yo-yo car sale is one in which a person purchases a car with dealer
arranged financing, pays a non-refundable deposit to the dealer, and drives
the car off the lot. Within a few days the dealer calls the purchaser saying
that the financing has been denied and that he or she must return the car. At
that point, the dealer keeps the non-refundable deposit and is able to resell
the car at full price.173 Yo-yo sales are highly profitable because once the
buyer returns the car, the buyer either has to come up with more money for
a larger down payment, agree to a higher interest rate, or agree to extend the
loan period to keep the car, return the car and forfeit the down payment, or
accept a lesser valued vehicle.
Similarly, spot delivery, a variation of the yo-yo car sale, occurs when
salespeople actually deliver the car to the purchaser before financing has been
approved and then later require the purchaser to return the car. Again, the
purchaser either loses their deposit or is forced to pay a higher interest rate.174
A radio advertisement enticed one middle-aged Navajo male car buyer to
a dealership about 100 miles from his home.175 He signed a contract to purchase a vehicle and drove the vehicle home. Days later, the dealership called
and demanded he return the car because his financing was not approved.
The dealer threatened that the vehicle would be reported stolen to the police
if not returned. However, the buyer was unable to return the car until his
employer approved the time off. When the buyer returned the vehicle the
dealership asked him to make a higher down payment to keep the vehicle.
Because the buyer declined to put more money down, salespeople took him
into a separate room and swore at him. In retaliation and to compensate for
the buyer’s refusal to make a higher down payment, the dealership forced
him to pay a mileage fee exactly equal to the higher down payment before he
could leave. After this incident, the buyer continued to receive threats from
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the dealer.176 Border town auto dealers will go to great lengths to secure any
type of profit, even where no sale can be made.
6. Faulty vehicles
Border town auto dealers also profit by selling faulty vehicles to Navajo car buyers for full price. Many Navajo car buyers complained that
their vehicles broke down on the way home from the dealership or shortly
thereafter.177 After complaining about being sold a faulty vehicle, one buyer
reported being lectured by the dealer about leaving the lights on, which was
not the cause of the mechanical defect at all.178 Another buyer reported being
forced to leave the dealership on foot when she could not pay for repairs for
a mechanical issue she discovered on the way home from the dealership.179
In an extreme case, one middle-aged buyer was sold a vehicle that had to be
repossessed because it had no VIN number, which made the car impossible
to register and insure. A representative of the dealer rudely told the faultless
man and his wife “they were screwed” in reference to the dealership’s own
actions.180 Navajo buyers who were sold faulty vehicles also often complained
of expensive repairs. The repairs on one woman’s newly purchased vehicle
were so expensive the woman could not make payments and the vehicle
was repossessed.181 Additionally, some buyers complained of conditions in
auto contracts that repairs could only be done at the dealership, which was
hundreds of miles from the buyers’ homes.182
7. Repossessions
Like interest rates, repossessions are yet another way subprime auto
lenders profit from Navajo car buyers. While the Navajo Nation Code limits vehicle repossession on the Navajo Nation,183 illegal repossessions are
still common occurrences. Because of the Navajo Code restricting vehicle
repossession, many repo men wait until a family leaves the Navajo Nation
boundaries so that they can repossess the vehicle in a border town. An elder
woman recounted a repo man who “literally pulled an old lady and man out
of their truck” at a laundromat in Gallup.184 In another instance, Santander
Consumer USA, Inc. hired a Tohono O’edham tribal member to repossess
vehicles on the Navajo Nation. This repo woman came to a Navajo elder’s
home even after the elder had entered into an agreement with Santander to
make up her $200 debt. The repo woman took the vehicle after agreeing to
return it in two days, but instead permanently repossessed it.185
When their cars are repossessed, Navajo car buyers suffer great financial
loss and hardship. One elderly couple pulled from their vehicle was only
one month behind on their payments and had made payments on the car for
years.186 The car taken by the repo woman had five years of payments, with
only a few months remaining to pay it off.187 In circumstances like these,
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lenders profit tremendously because they can resell the car for full value and
keep all of the payments the original car buyer made. The Navajo car-buying
population represents just a small fraction of the profits lenders and investors make from subprime auto loans. But the deceptive and aggressive sales
tactics used on Navajo car buyers in border towns bring concentrated profits
to border town auto dealers and their subprime lending partners.

C. Contracts of Navajo car buyers
Below are two sample car sales contracts from recent Navajo car buyers.
They are not representative of all Navajo car buyers’ contracts, but are not
atypical.188 These contracts illustrate how border town auto dealers use various combinations of the aggressive and illegal sales tactics mentioned above
to sell high interest contracts and loans and to maximize profits.
1. Mary’s Ford Fiesta
Mary,189 a 70-year-old Navajo woman, purchased a new 2014 Ford Fiesta
at a border town’s only dealership. A 2014 Ford Fiesta’s sales price with the
same amenities should have been around $14,880.190 However, on Mary’s
contract, the car price was $21,972.28. This was a 48 percent dealer markup.
The dealership also added several deceptive and/or illegal add-ons to the
price of the car. First, the dealership charged her $3,000 for a manufacturer
warranty that could have been negotiated down to a much lower price.191
Second, the dealership charged Mary with a $389.99 “Dealer Documentary
Fee.” Third, the dealer charged Mary $282.56 for “Payments . . . to Public Officials for Official Fees.” Fourth, the dealer charged Mary $900 for unneeded
GAP protection. With tax,192 this totals $4571.56 in unnecessary add-ons
that contributed to a higher interest profit for both the dealer and the lender.
On top of the add-ons, the lender charged Mary an 18.1 percent APR interest rate. In fact, the $16,595 total in interest charged on her new car exceeded
the Fiesta’s value. Although Mary’s actual income was $900 a month,193 the
lender forged her finance application and reported Mary’s monthly income at
$5,711. Mary did not have a chance to review the finance application and the
lender did not request her to provide any of her own financial information.
However, this forgery did not seem to reduce her interest rate,194 and she still
ended up with an 18.10 percent APR interest rate and a loan term of 6 years
(72 months) with monthly payments of $580.55. Payments at this rate were
unsustainable and left Mary with only about $320 dollars to cover all of her
other monthly expenses.
2. Susie’s Dodge Challenger
Susie, a 54-year old Navajo woman, purchased a used 2013 Dodge Challenger. The sticker price was $24,577.50, which was reasonable.195 However,
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Susie was charged $2,300 for a vehicle service contract, $389 for a “Dealer
Documentary Fee,” $22.50 for payments made to “Public Officials for Official
Fees,” and $900 for GAP insurance. This totaled $3,611.50 in unnecessary
but negotiable add-ons. Altogether, the sticker price with the add-ons, minus
$200 trade-in value and a $400 down payment, totaled $27,589. While most
of the contract value seems accurate, despite the overpriced service contract
and unnecessary GAP insurance, Susie was charged a 22.42 percent interest
rate. The result was a $706.55 monthly payment, and a total in interest of
$23,282.60, an amount almost equal to the worth of her car.196 This interest
plus the principal price made Susie’s final obligation $51,471.60. The price
is unreasonable considering Susie’s income was $360 a month in General
Assistance benefits. Despite that, the dealership forged Susie’s finance application and stated her monthly income was $5,408. Her finance application
also stated falsely that she had been retired for twenty-five years.

D. Impact on Navajo individuals, families, communities,
and the Navajo Nation
The “predatory lending practices [in] Corporate America” have a greater
effect on communities of color,197 working class, and under-educated populations.198 Minority groups—especially African-Americans and Latinos—suffered higher losses in the subprime mortgage crisis, even where their credit
scores were comparable to their white counterparts.199 Similar disparities
appear in credit card lending,200 payday, title, tax refund anticipation, and
rent-to-own consumer loans201—and these institutions are typically “concentrated in minority neighborhoods.”202
As in other areas of consumer law, auto dealers and subprime auto lenders
specifically target people of color, women, and the poor. These communities
bear the negative effects of subprime auto loans unduly.203 A study by Ian
Ayers and Peter Seigelman found that women and African-American test buyers were quoted higher car prices by dealers than male and white test buyers,
even when the test buyers stated they had their own financing.204 Ayers and
Seigelman postulated that this differentiated race and gender treatment was
based on “statistical discrimination.” The researchers found that prejudicial
inferences were not based on “psychological distaste for associating with
blacks and women” but on the additional costs dealers assumed minority and
women buyers would have interest in or ability to pay.205 Auto dealers’ racial
and gender discriminatory practices appear to carry over into auto lenders’
practices. In 2014, Santander Holding Consumer USA Inc., a large nationwide subprime auto lender, was found by the Consumer Protection Bureau
to have “systematically discriminated against 235,000 Black, Hispanic, and
Asian-Pacific Islander borrowers” in the prior three years.206
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Like other minority communities across the U.S., unfair consumer laws
affect Indian Country communities disproportionately. Payday lenders and
other consumer loan companies are concentrated within tribal lands and surrounding border towns.207 The Seattle Times recently uncovered an elaborate,
predatory scheme by national mobile home manufacturer Clayton Homes.208
In its predatory lending scheme, Clayton Homes falsely represented itself as
the only mobile home lender for Navajo Nation residents to steer Navajo Nation residents into its costly subprime mobile home loans and away from low
interest federal and tribal lending programs.209 Predatory lending practices
have unusually harsh consequences on Native American individuals, families,
and communities because of intergenerational poverty, barriers to building
credit, and racism towards Native Americans. Subprime loans amount to
“exploitation of the poor, the desperate, and /or unsophisticated”—communities most in need of protection.210
The deceitful, and sometimes illegal, sales tactics of border town auto
dealers have injurious financial and emotional effects on Navajo car buyers.
Subprime loans provide Navajo car buyers “with the opportunity to purchase”
a needed car “but they also burden the consumer with excessive charges and
fees when a consumer defaults on the payment.”211 Many Navajo car buyers
complain that they could not afford monthly car payments.212 Further, Navajo
car buyers complain of long loan terms.213 As one elder woman put it, “by
the time the loan is paid off, the vehicle no longer works.”214 Border town
dealers “will always look for ways to finance a vehicle even if it means the
lender will eventually be stuck with the risks of making a loan to a consumer
who does not have the capital or collateral to even buy a vehicle in the first
place.”215 And “a persistent pattern of predatory sales practices,” including
“financing arrangements that harm and hurt the consumer,” are widespread
among Navajo Nation car buyers.216
The heightened need for cars and economic circumstances among Navajo
car buyers combined with the extreme sales tactics employed by border town
auto dealers make subprime lending more frequent and more profitable—a
bigger problem on the Navajo Nation compared to the rest of the United
States.217 As Navajo Nation residents’ incomes are generally low, Navajo
Nation home value does not equate to homes on fee land.218 Many families
are already in cycles of debt and it is difficult for Navajo Nation car buyers to
build credit.219 Thus, Navajo car buyers frequently must resort to purchasing
subprime auto loans.220 Accordingly, border town auto dealers commonly
use subprime lending companies to secure high interest, long-term loans for
Navajo car buyers.221 This means that Navajo car buyers are more strongly
targeted for and impacted by subprime loans and their salespeople, dealers,
lenders, and investors are profiting from Navajo car buyers at much higher
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rates than they would be selling to car buyers in other demographic groups.
The bad car deals and subprime auto lending described herein is harmful to Navajo individuals and families.222 Many car buyers feel remorse,
embarrassment, and shame that they were “scammed or cheated” into a car
purchase.223 Some also experience sickness from the stress of unfair auto
deals and subprime loans.224 The debt accrued from these high principal,
high interest loans is financially devastating to Navajo families.225 Many
buyers describe auto bills exceeding or nearly exceeding their monthly
income, which makes it harder to meet daily survival needs.226 APRs, loan
terms, monthly bills, and total car buying costs near or above the families’
incomes227 demonstrate why low income Navajo families disproportionately
suffer from the effects of unfair car deals and subprime auto loans.
Within the impacted Navajo families, elders and families with young college students are especially vulnerable. Many Navajo elders are targeted by
auto salespeople because they are English illiterate and unable to understand
the words written into the contracts and, sometimes, even the spoken words in
contract negotiations. Navajo elders are more likely to be victims of predatory
sales because they live on fixed incomes, have “nebulous understandings of
money management” and do not speak or understand English.228 Border town
auto dealers also target elders because of their cultural belief that a person’s
verbal promise is of the highest importance.
The English and financial illiteracy among many Navajo elders and the
high value many elders place on verbal promises benefit auto dealers in
two ways: (1) many elders believe the salesperson’s oral promises and (2)
auto dealers can change the terms of their promises on paper without elders
noticing.229 In some instances some less than scrupulous immediate family
members of Navajo elder car buyers use the vulnerabilities of their relative
by getting him or her to purchase cars for the younger relative or cosign on
the younger relative’s car loans.230
Dealers also play into the familial closeness and sense of shared responsibility of many traditional Navajo families by pressuring car buyers’ relatives
to trade in vehicles or take over old car loans so a contract can be made for
a relative that day. 231 Unfair border town auto deals and subprime loans to
college students and their families also illustrate barriers to building intergenerational wealth and higher education among Navajo car buyers.232
The cumulative effects of the individual and familial hardships created
by unfair auto deals and subprime auto loans disproportionately threaten
the welfare of larger Navajo communities and the Navajo Nation as a whole.
Over half of Navajo car buyers surveyed reported unfair auto deals and high
interest long term subprime car loans,233 including repossessions, yo-yo
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sales, threats, and the loss of employment related to their car purchase. 234
Meanwhile, Navajo Nation car buyers’ “serious purchasing power”235 feeds
the border town auto dealers and state treasuries—but not the Navajo people
or the Navajo Nation’s economy. The exacerbated circumstances of Navajo
subprime auto loans threaten the Navajo Nation economy, and ultimately
contribute to the deficits in national auto lending.

III. Solutions to the unfair auto deal and subprime
lending problem among Navajo car buyers
While unfair auto deals and subprime lending have been a longstanding
practice in Navajo Nation border towns, this problem is not without remedies.
Because it is so pervasive, activists seeking a solution need to take a multifaceted approach. However, any solution that creates barriers to car sales and
reduces the population that is eligible to purchase a car has the unintended
side-effect of ensuring that many Navajo car buyers cannot purchase a car.
As car ownership is essential for survival for Navajo people, not owning a
working vehicle could be far more problematic than debt. Solutions to the
unfair auto deal and subprime lending problem among Navajo car buyers
need to account for this problem.

A. Play “the game”: A (non)solution
To survive the unfair car deals described above, some Navajo car buyers, have developed a resourceful (non)solution to the unfair auto deal and
subprime lending. I characterize it as the “game” and is a synthesis of the
Navajo car buyer data presented above. Instead of resisting these often unfair
and high interest loans some Navajo car buyers have learned to play lenders
at their own game.236
First, a Navajo car buyer purchases a car from a dealer at a high interest
rate, perhaps knowing that it will be an unfair deal. Even so, the buyer considers it the only available option because of a low income and credit score. The
buyer leaves the dealership with the car and a very high monthly payment,
knowing he or she will not be able to pay them. Meanwhile, the dealer and
salespeople benefit immediately by cashing in on the car’s full sale price and
any kickbacks as soon as they sell the buyer’s contract to the lender. Then the
buyer and lender begin a game of chicken, to see who gives in first.
If the lender can force the buyer into making enough payments to cover
the cost of the vehicle plus profit the lender wins. This happens relatively fast
because the payments include the high interest. However, if the buyer stops
paying, uses the car, and gets the car repossessed before the lender profits
on the sale, the buyer wins. The buyer can then go out and get another car at
a similarly high interest rate and repeat the process.
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This approach requires the buyer to disregard the impact this game will
have on his or her credit. I theorize some Navajo car buyers have accepted
being in debt and will pay while they can to keep the car. They may go into
car negotiations knowing that their interest rate will be astronomical but
will have no other way to acquire a necessary vehicle. They may expect
and face repossession, but the immediate life sustaining benefits of having
a car outweigh the losses. In this circumstance, the buyer gains the use of a
vehicle while the dealer loses out on the buyer’s payments for a long as possible. This allows those with low credit scores, perpetuated by poverty and
debt, to use a car. This game is especially probable given that many border
town dealers are willing to forge financial applications. Further, the Navajo
Nation’s protective repossession provisions enable buyers who can no longer
make payments to use the car for a longer period before repossession than a
buyer living outside the Navajo Nation would typically have.237
However, the risks and losses for a buyer who is successful at this “game”
are devastating in the long term. The buyer’s losses in this situation are all
of the stresses involved with unreasonably high monthly payments, including further credit destruction, vehicle repossession, bill collection calls, and
continued barriers to acquiring a vehicle. The biggest problem with this approach is that it continues to trap car buyers in a debt cycle.
The savvy reader will ask “but what about the deficiency cost left for the
buyer to pay after the repossession of the vehicle?” The answer to this question brings unfair border town auto dealers and subprime lending full circle
by “churning” the car. If a car worth $15,000 is repossessed after the buyer
made $10,000 in payments, the lending agency auctions the car to a dealer
for $12,000. This would leave the original buyer with a $3,000 deficiency
still owed. However, if the purchasing dealer can resell the car to another
Navajo car buyer for $21,000, it would cover both the $3,000 deficiency and
the $12,000 price paid for the car, plus make the dealer $6,000 in profit. With
such high profits, the dealer can afford to pay the original buyer’s deficiency,
leaving the original buyer open to a new unfair car deal. Thus, churning perpetuates unreasonable markups and cycles of debt for other Navajo car buyers.
Although dealers’, lenders’, and buyers’ maneuvers in this game are less
than noble, the Navajo car buyer’s role is a creative use of personal agency.238
The experience of living with racism and poverty in almost every aspect of
daily life,239 which includes exploitation in regular transactions, has led to
resilience and ingenuity among Navajo car buyers that allow them to work
the auto sales system to their short-term advantage. Playing the game does
not result in turning the tables because whether Navajo car buyers “lose” or
“win” the game, they remain in growing cycles of debt and stress. Thus the
game is not financially, emotionally, or economically sustainable.
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B. Prospective solutions
Education about the unfair sales tactics and buyer’s rights in car sales
and lending could be presented through multiple methods. The public needs
access to information about predatory lending schemes and aggressive sales
tactics. This information needs to be provided in Navajo and English. Outreach efforts should include the radio, local newspapers, and word of mouth.
In this outreach, potential car buyers need to be educated specifically with
information that border town salesmen, dealers, and lenders are looking to
make the highest profit and have no incentive to ensure the car buyer can
afford the vehicle.240
Further, Navajo people must be educated on the components of an auto
contract and a buyer’s rights in contract negotiations.241 Again, any education materials need to be provided in Navajo and English. While brochures
on this topic exist, they are often useless because many Navajo elders do not
fully comprehend written English, especially if it contains difficult auto and
financial jargon. Informational sessions conducted in the Navajo language
could address these education issues. Such sessions could be presented at
Navajo Nation fairs, schools, chapter houses, and senior centers. Another
way to get this information out would be a series of video public service
announcements with clear explanations in both English and Navajo shown
via YouTube, local radio stations, and television.
Finally, formal financial literacy education in schools within the Navajo
Nation and in border towns should be mandatory. This would be especially
helpful to high school and community college students so that they will not
be duped into an unfair auto deal or a subprime loan that would destroy their
credit the first time they purchase a car. Ideally, those students would pass
information on to their family members. Targeting the younger generation,
who have yet to establish their credit history with financial literacy would
allow the Navajo Nation to, hopefully, break the cycle of unfair auto deals
and low credit.
Second, the Navajo Nation government should deny support to border
town auto dealers that use unfair sales tactics and prey on Navajo buyers. The
Navajo government should take steps to prevent future predatory practices.
One way to deny Navajo Nation support is to prohibit bad border town auto
dealers from advertising on Navajo Nation land, local television and radio,
fairs, sporting events, and at tribal casinos.
To address predatory practices the Navajo Nation could also develop a
code of ethics, applicable to border town auto dealers. The foundation for
this ethical code could be the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (“UNDRIP”).242 The ethical code could require border
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town salespeople and dealers to undergo mandatory training sessions with
curriculum on unfair auto sales practices. The ethical code could also establish
a public rating system, showing prospective Navajo car buyers which dealers
engage in ethical transactions. A rating system would also incentivize dealers
to compete for high ratings.
However, these two solutions would limit Navajo buyers’ access to dealers.
To address the limited dealership options, and to empower the Navajo Nation
to harness members’ purchasing power, the Navajo Nation could create car
dealerships within its borders.243 Creating car dealerships would stimulate
the Navajo Nation economy, be convenient for Navajo Nation residents, and
create a way for the Navajo Nation legislature and courts to regulate auto sales
to Navajo buyers. Further, the hundreds of millions of dollars in Navajo car
buyers’ spending power could benefit Navajo people by increasing Navajo
Nation infrastructure, educational quality, employment, and living conditions.
Third, to address the unfair deals and practices, the Navajo car buyers
could pursue litigation. For example, the ACLU or other non-profits could
sue for unfair practices.244 However, up to this point, very few state, federal
and tribal judges have heard Navajo car buyers’ claims because auto dealers
settle claims before their unscrupulous practices are made public.245
Fourth, to address unfair car deals and subprime loans, increased state,
tribal, or federal regulations on car dealers’ activities should be imposed. For
example, interest rate caps in Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah would reduce
the exorbitantly high APR rates and finance charges that Navajo car buyers
are currently being charged. This alone would not result in any sweeping
change and alone would also limit many Navajo car buyers’ abilities to finance
a car; and is therefore an impractical solution.
Fifth, reducing interest rates would combat Navajo car buyers’ financial
losses and debt cycles. One radical way to eliminate the high interest payments dealers and lenders charge is through the traditional lending circle.246
In lending circles, groups of people needing loans contribute to a common
pool and periodically pay one person a loan. For low-income individuals who
cannot make large purchases or investments in cash, lending circles are much
easier than a savings account because they can contribute a small amount on
a regular basis and then receive a large amount when needed. In the border
town auto deal situation, a participant in a lending circle could pay the full
cash price of a car without having to worry about interest. However, there
could be a lot of distrust of informal lending circles and it could be difficult
to implement among low-income borrowers.247
Finally, Navajo buyers could join a credit union in an effort to decrease
APRs.248 The first “credit unions were built around people who had ‘a com-
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monality of needs,’ because ‘[p]eople working, or associating, or living
together in compact communities knew each other and were usually aware
of a colleague’s ability or disposition to repay a loan.’”249 Credit unions are
different than banks because they do not loan their own revenue, instead
they collect “savings funds from members’ accounts” and distribute “them
in the form of interest-earning loans and other investments.”250 Thus, buyers with low credit benefit from the lower interest rates offered by credit
unions. Navajo car buyers who want to take advantage of these low interest
rates could establish membership with a credit union sometime before their
purchase.251 In the ideal situation, the Navajo Nation could establish its own
credit union tailored to Navajo Nation citizens’ needs.

Conclusion
Navajo people are suffering the consequences of high debt and pass these
problems down to the next generation because cars are essential to Navajo
survival. Meanwhile, through racist, deceptive, and exploitive practices,
border town auto dealers and subprime lenders target and exploit a vulnerable minority group. These practices run counter to racial and social justice.
Navajo car buyers, advocates, teachers, the Navajo Nation, border town car
dealers and sales people, and border town communities must take steps to
end the unfair auto deals and subprime lending occurring on and near the
Navajo Nation.
Millions of dollars have been stripped from the Navajo economy. These
unfair circumstances cause immense stress. While the (non)solution game
allows some Navajo car buyers to use a vehicle, it is not sustainable. Replacing unfair border town auto deals, subprime auto loans, and the “game” with
a comprehensive and thoughtful combination of the solutions could halt the
exploitation occurring with border town auto sales and, instead, empower
and Navajo car buyers, families, and communities by making them financially stable.
____________________
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